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MONTESQUIEU ON COMMERCE, 
CONQUEST, WAR, AND PEACE 
Robert Howse* 
I. INTRODUCTION: COMMERCE AS THE AGENT OF PEACE: MONTESQUIEU 
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LIBERALISM 
n the history of liberalism, Montesquieu, who died two hundred and 
fifty years ago, is an iconic figure. Montesquieu is cited as the 
source of the idea of checks and balances, or separation of powers, and 
thus as an intellectual inspiration of the American founding.1 Among 
liberal internationalists, Montesquieu is known above all for the notion 
that international trade leads to peace among nation-states. When liberal 
international relations theorists such as Michael Doyle attribute this posi-
tion to Montesquieu,2 they cite Book XX of the Spirit of the Laws,3 in 
which Montesquieu claims: “The natural effect of commerce is to bring 
peace. Two nations that negotiate between themselves become recipro-
cally dependent, if one has an interest in buying and the other in selling. 
And all unions are based on mutual needs.”4 
On its own, Montesquieu’s claim raises many issues. Montesquieu’s 
point is that trade based on mutual dependency discourages war. Here, 
Montesquieu abstracts entirely from the relative power of the states in 
question, a concern that is pervasive in his concrete analyses of relation-
ships among political communities. For example, later on in the same 
section of the Spirit of the Laws he mentions that trade relations between 
Carthage and Marseille led to jealousy and a security conflict: 
There were, in the early times, great wars between Carthage and Mar-
seille concerning the fishery. After the peace, they competed in eco-
nomic commerce. Marseille was all the more jealous, that, while equal 
to its rival in industry, it was becoming inferior in power. Thus the rea-
son for its great loyalty to the Romans. The war the Romans fought 
against the Carthaginians in Spain was a source of riches for Marseille, 
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 1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). See also HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, 
JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 214 
(1989). 
 2. Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Internationalism: Peace, War and Democracy, 
http://nobelprize.org/peace/articles/doyle/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). 
 3. All citations to the Spirit of the Laws are by book and chapter number. The trans-
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COMPLETES: DE L’ ESPRIT DES LOIS [2 COMPLETE WORKS: SPIRIT OF THE LAWS] (Roger 
Caillois ed., Gallimard 1951) (1748). 
 4. Id. bk. XX, ch. 2. 
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which served as a supply port.  The ruin of Carthage and Corinth in-
creased still more the glory of Marseille. And, but for the civil wars, 
where it was necessary to close one’s eyes and choose a side, it would 
have been happy under the protection of Romans, who were not jealous 
of its commerce.5 
Montesquieu claims that commerce can cure “destructive prejudices” 
and render manners (moeurs) gentle.6 But he also, and equally emphati-
cally, suggests that prejudices and ferocious manners impede or prevent 
commerce: “[In the case of the Romans and the Parthians] far from there 
being commerce, there wasn’t even communication: ambition, jealousy, 
religion, hatred, manners kept everything apart.”7 Does not then the dis-
ease itself prevent the proposed cure? 
In the opening of the Spirit of the Laws, Book I, which sets out the 
view of human nature on which the work is premised, Montesquieu pre-
sents human beings as naturally timid and non-conflictual, while it is 
social dependency and interdependency that lead to aggression, distrust 
and conflict.8 Why then should conflict not be engendered by trade de-
pendency or interdependency? For Judith Shklar, Montesquieu’s mean-
ing is that commerce and conquest are alternative means of satisfying the 
needs of a state: “Commerce is the object of free states, while conquest is 
the aim of despotic ones and, as [Montesquieu] knew, all continental 
monarchies as well.”9 Yet, Montesquieu himself seems at least as much 
impressed with the extent to which conquest and colonialism (and indeed 
even genocide and mass exile) went hand in hand with the development 
of commerce, at least historically. He goes so far as to suggest: “The his-
tory of commerce is that of the communication of peoples. Their various 
destructions, and the displacement and devastation of population groups, 
are its greatest events.”10  Elsewhere, Montesquieu states that the con-
quests of Egypt and India by Alexander the Great were among the events 
that made a great revolution in commerce, and he asks whether “it [is] 
necessary to conquer a country in order to have commerce with it.”11 
For those who are inclined to reduce philosophy to a set of slogans, 
Montesquieu is a dangerous thinker to cite and an impossible one to un-
derstand. There is hardly a generalization in his Spirit of the Laws that is 
not qualified or contradicted by another generalization, or put in question 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. bk. XXI, ch.11. 
 6. Id. bk. XX, ch. 1. 
 7. Id. bk. XXI, ch. 16. 
 8. Id. bk. I, chs. 2–3. 
 9. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 107 (1987). 
 10. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. XXI, ch. 5. 
 11. Id. bk. XXI, ch. 8. 
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by Montesquieu’s own examples. Despite Montesquieu’s own insistence 
in the preface that the work has a plan or design, Montesquieu’s manner 
of proceeding through self-correction (or, less charitably, self-
contradiction) has led some illustrious readers to complain of its disor-
ganization.12 
While, as already noted, liberals consider Montesquieu a “liberal,” his 
liberalism is seductive and subversive rather than moralistic and revolu-
tionary. Montesquieu does not recommend the replacement of an ille-
gitimate order, the ancien regime, by a legitimate regime. He is not a 
precursor of the (bourgeois) French Revolution, and a strain in French 
scholarship and political theory thus regards him as a reactionary, an 
aristocrat defending class interests.13 Montesquieu is critical of every 
kind of political regime, however liberal, and on the other hand, is fatal-
istic about power and constraint as endemic in the human condition. For 
Montesquieu, liberty is not seized in a single stroke that replaces the re-
gime of Throne and Altar with the regime of rights, but is to be found in 
the margins of the actual power relations and, above all, in the subtle 
transformation of those relations from dangerous and illiberal forms of 
dependency into more benign and gentle forms of mutual dependency. 
While leading, in some circles, to the view of Montesquieu as a reaction-
ary, this way of thinking led Louis Althusser to view Montesquieu, in 
some respects, as a (defective or inconsistent) precursor of a certain kind 
of Marxist social theory.14 
II. WAR AND CONQUEST: BOOKS IX AND X OF THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
 Montesquieu elaborates his views on war and peace prior to his sys-
tematic consideration of commerce in Books XX and XXI of the Spirit of 
the Laws. He begins his discussion of defensive force in Book IX with 
the proposition that all regimes, whether republican, aristocratic or mon-
archic, are subject to the same dilemma: if they are small, they will be 
destroyed by external force, whereas if they are large they will be de-
stroyed by “internal vice.”15 While carefully prepared by Montesquieu’s 
dissections in Part I of the Spirit of the Laws of the internal contradic-
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tions that plague both ancient republics and modern monarchies,16 Mon-
tesquieu’s bold statement at the outset of Book IX that no regime can 
combine internal health and effective external defense represents an ar-
resting indictment of the entire tradition of political philosophy. The 
search for the best regime, meaning the best “city” or the best “state,” the 
best “closed” political community,17 is utterly futile. The achievement of 
sound internal governance merely leads to vulnerability and ultimate de-
struction by external force. Only a despot can act fully consistently in 
internal and external affairs. 
While most commentators assume that, for Montesquieu, England is 
the model of the ideal constitution or regime,18 Montesquieu in no way 
exempts England from his verdict. Montesquieu understands political 
liberty not in terms of citizenship and formal rights of political participa-
tion, but in terms of each individual’s sense of personal security and the 
“tranquility of spirit” that flows from it: “the government must be such 
that a citizen cannot fear another citizen.”19 But, if liberty is really this 
“tranquility of spirit,” then no single political regime can guarantee lib-
erty, even if it creates an order where one does not fear one’s fellow citi-
zens, because no single political regime can guarantee against external 
aggression. There are external threats to this “tranquility of spirit” that 
are as menacing as internal threats; as Montesquieu demonstrates in the 
many examples he presents in the Spirit of the Laws, throughout history, 
the lives and property of individuals have been destroyed as much 
through external conflict as internal oppression. 
But, in Book IX, Montesquieu does suggest that there is a form of po-
litical association that can combine internal good governance with effec-
tive external defense: a republican federation.20 This is a “society of so-
cieties” that results from the merging of previously sovereign political 
                                                                                                             
 16. Ancient republics are maintained by “virtue”—an almost fanatical overcoming of 
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cult to assure the obedience of the officials, lords, etc., that are required to administer the 
parts of this large territory, since they operate far from the capital. Because of this prob-
lem, a large monarchy tends to degenerate into a despotism. Id. bk. VIII, ch. 17. 
 17. Id. bk. I, ch. 3. 
 18. See, e.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 1, at 230. 
 19. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. XI, ch. 6. 
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bodies (corps politiques).21  Montesquieu credits the form of republican 
federation with the fact that in Europe, Holland, Germany and Switzer-
land have been able to become “eternal republics.”22 At first, Montes-
quieu suggests that the model of a republican federation can only work if 
the entities that form the federation are themselves republics: “The spirit 
of monarchy is war and aggrandizement; the spirit of the republic is 
peace and moderation. These two types of governments cannot co-exist 
in a republican federation, except in a forced manner.”23 But, Montes-
quieu then mentions an institutional innovation that can solve this diffi-
culty: Germany is in fact composed of both former principalities and free 
cities.24 This is possible because Germany has given itself a “chief,” a 
leader of the federation as a whole.25 
The existence of an independent level of governance at the federal 
level demarcates the republican federation from confederations such as 
the ancient Greek leagues, which proved unstable and ultimately not 
“eternal.”26  Removing the obstacle created by the mixed nature of the 
regimes of the different members of a republican federation, the possibil-
ity of this federal level of governance eliminates the only constraint ex-
plicitly mentioned by Montesquieu on the capacity of a republican fed-
eration “to expand through new associates united with it.”27  Montes-
quieu, who emphasizes throughout the Spirit of the Laws the relationship 
between domestic laws and factors such as climate and culture, does not 
apparently consider these factors as fatal to the merging of societies into 
a republican federation.  Far from his ultimate teaching being one of rela-
tivism or determinism, Montesquieu’s detailed examination of the par-
ticularities of domestic laws in their relation to the local, by giving the 
local its due, allows one to believe that the local and the particular can 
co-exist with a (potentially) universal legal system. The differences in 
laws produced by the effects of climate, local culture, geography, etc., 
can be handled through a federal union, either through complete devolu-
tion of regulation in areas where these factors are naturally determina-
tive, or through subsidiarity (room to deviate from, or adjust federal law 
to reflect local contingencies). 
By attributing differences in the laws to fixed particularities such as 
climate, Montesquieu is usually regarded as taking the side of difference 
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against that of universality, and thus as the precursor of historicism.28 On 
the contrary, he is preparing the ground for a certain kind of universalism 
by attributing the particularities of domestic or local laws to factors other 
than unbridgeable divides of belief and value, conflicting gods and de-
mons—to use Max Weber’s turn of phrase—which would make it im-
possible for different peoples to live together in peace. Montesquieu is 
perhaps the original thinker of “path dependency”: within each political 
community the laws reflect a dynamic relation between the form of gov-
ernment and other factors that, historically, would naturally have influ-
enced lawmaking in that particular setting (climate, etc.).29 There is a 
diversity of laws, both over time and among different political communi-
ties at a given time, which would at face value make any project depend-
ing on legal harmonization or integration seem utterly unrealistic.  How-
ever, differences in laws that are attributable to “path dependency” of 
individual societies may well be tractable to degrees of harmonization. 
Once one understands legal differences as the consequence of the differ-
ent “paths” that particular societies have taken, rather than as expressions 
of conflicting ideals of government, they ought to be negotiable in the 
service of the project of federation. 
Thus, in looking at the laws as they have developed historically in the 
different ideal types of regime—monarchy, republicanism/democracy, 
aristocracy—Montesquieu shows that the actual differences in laws are 
not so much a product of the ideal type of government as of the interac-
tion of that ideal type with many accidental and contingent factors. Un-
derstood as legal integration, the merging of a monarchy with a republic, 
for example, is something very different than the attempt to wed together 
two conflicting ideal forms of government. We must face diversity and 
understand it, in order to overcome it as an obstacle to universal legality, 
and further understand that universal legality can entail something less 
than full homogenization of positive law, i.e., accommodating differ-
ences that are non-threatening to the “spirit” of the laws. 
 Admittedly, Montesquieu attributes some particularities of laws to dif-
ferences in religious convictions in different societies, but these differ-
ences, for Montesquieu, usually amount to “prejudices” or “superstition,” 
which are susceptible to being removed as interaction between peoples 
and individuals increases, whether through commerce, immigration or 
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intermarriage. It is notable that the distinctive domestic laws criticized by 
Montesquieu as fanatical or against nature tend to be attributed by him to 
prejudice, not to the kinds of local factors that might explain “reason-
able” differences between laws. These are laws that deserve to be re-
moved even by imperial conquest. Such laws are presented by Montes-
quieu as even less “reasonable” than despotism. 
Montesquieu’s remarks about war and conquest in Books IX and X 
must be understood in light of his dramatic presentation of a continu-
ously expanding republican federation as the only adequate solution to 
the problem of politics. He begins with the proposition that between “na-
tions” the use of offensive force is “regulated” by the ius gentium.30 Un-
der the ius gentium, the legitimate use of offensive force is based on the 
natural right of self-preservation. However, the right of self-preservation 
in the case of peoples results in a broader scope for the use of force than 
in the case of individuals. An individual can only exercise the right of 
self-defense on those “immediate occasions where he would be lost if he 
waited for the assistance of the laws.”31 In the case of societies, the effec-
tiveness of the right of self-defense depends largely upon the possibility 
of pre-emption. Even in time of peace, where another society has ac-
quired the power to destroy it, a society must be able to attack preemp-
tively; the law, including the police, cannot be counted on to intervene to 
prevent the destruction of the weaker power by the (now) stronger one.32  
Following Thucydides here, Montesquieu suggests that any peace among 
nations is intrinsically unstable; the temptation of states to exploit peace 
to increase their (relative) power is in the nature of things, and irresistible 
for certain regimes.33 This leads to insecurity on the part of other states 
and a (justifiable) collapse of the peace. Only if international law were 
able to equalize power between states could this insecurity be avoided, 
and the right to preemption legitimately narrowed or limited to situations 
of immediate attack. In a world of sovereign states, significant differ-
ences in relative power appear to Montesquieu as inevitable. By contrast, 
a republican federation is well suited to integrating both small and large 
states and mediating the implications of differences in size peacefully, 
through federal institutions.34 
                                                                                                             
 30. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. X, ch. 1. 
 31. Id. bk. 10, ch. 2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. According to Thucydides, the truest cause of the Peloponnesian War was the 
growth of Athenian power, which made other cities, and eventually Sparta itself, inse-
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In a remarkable single stroke, Montesquieu endorses the right to con-
quest as a necessary implication of the right to self-preservation. He 
bluntly accepts the possibility that the only way of countering the secu-
rity threat that led to the use of force in the first place is to conquer and 
colonize the enemy. However, through grounding the right to conquest in 
the natural right of self-preservation, Montesquieu places a set of deriva-
tive legal constraints on the manner in which the right to conquest may 
be exercised. Strategies such as the destruction or enslavement of the 
conquered people are contrary to the natural right of self-preservation; 
they are only justifiable if there is no other means of eliminating the se-
curity threat posed by the conquered people. At the same time, the exer-
cise of the right to conquest, which at the end of the chapter Montesquieu 
qualifies as a “necessary, legitimate and unfortunate (malheureux)” right, 
“always leaves an immense debt to be paid, to vindicate oneself before 
human nature.”35 The ideal way of paying this debt, in the case of a re-
public, is to provide the conquered state with good administration and 
good civil laws.36 
Moreover, conquest can “destroy harmful prejudices” that may be an 
obstacle to different peoples being integrated or living together in a sin-
gle political community.37  Here, Montesquieu gives two examples: the 
peace treaty that Gelon made with the Carthaginians, which prohibited 
the practice of burning children, and Alexander the Great’s prohibition 
on the Bactrians sending their elderly parents to be eaten alive by big 
dogs. Alexander’s interdiction, Montesquieu tells us, was a “triumph that 
he won over prejudice.”38 
Alexander provides Montesquieu’s model for benign or beneficial 
conquest and empire:39 
He resisted those who wanted him to treat the Greeks like masters, and 
the Persians like slaves; he thought only of uniting the two nations, and 
making the distinction between conquering and conquered people dis-
appear. He abandoned, after the conquest, all the prejudices that had 
served him in conquering. He adopted the manners (moeurs) of the Per-
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sians, in order not to make them discontent with taking the manners of 
the Greeks . . . .40 
Alexander encouraged mixed marriages, a practice of which Montes-
quieu approves in other contexts as well. “After a certain passage of 
time, all of the constituent elements of the conquering state are connected 
to those of the conquered state, by customs, intermarriage, law, associa-
tions and a certain conformity of spirit.”41 This renders trust and peace 
possible based on equality between the peoples and the individuals who 
constitute them, and servitude of the conquered people definitively un-
necessary to ensure the security of the conquering society.  By degrees, 
empire is transformed into republican federation; the obstacle to republi-
can federation that Montesquieu flagged in Book IX:III—namely, that 
sovereign states of equal power, jealous of their sovereignty, are unlikely 
to be inclined to surrender it to federative power—does not prevent an 
empire from becoming a republican federation.42 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 40. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. X, ch. 14. 
 41. Id. bk. X, ch. 3. 
 42. Here, I have been influenced in my interpretation by Alexandre Kojève. Kojève 
cites the very same practice of Alexander the Great emphasized here by Montesquieu as 
the original model for the creation of the Universal and Homogenous State, a federal 
juridical order capable, in principle, of encompassing the entire world. According to Ko-
jève: 
What characterizes the political action of Alexander in contrast to the political 
action of all of his Greek predecessors and contemporaries, is that it was guided 
by the idea of empire, that is to say of a universal State, at least in the sense that 
this State had no a priori given limits (geographical, ethnic, or otherwise), no 
pre-established “capital,” not even a geographically and ethnically fixed center 
destined to exercise political dominion over its periphery. To be sure there have 
at all times been conquerors ready to extend the realm of their conquests in-
definitely. But as a rule they sought to establish the same type of relation be-
tween conquerors and conquered as that between Master and slave. Alexander, 
by contrast, was clearly read to dissolve the whole of Macedonia and of Greece 
in the new political unit created by his conquest, and to govern this unit from a 
geographical point he would have freely (rationally) chosen in terms of the new 
whole. Moreover, by requiring Macedonians and Greeks to enter into mixed 
marriages with “Barbarians,” he was surely intending to create a new ruling 
stratum that would be independent of all rigid and given ethnic support. 
Alexandre Kojève, Tyranny and Wisdom, in LEO STRAUSS, ON TYRANNY 135, 170 (Vic-
tor Gourevitch & Michael S. Roth eds., rev. and expanded ed. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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III. LUXURY COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC COMMERCE 
Montesquieu’s view of commerce and its relation to war and conquest 
depends on a crucial distinction that he draws between the commerce of 
luxury and economic commerce. The commerce of luxury serves the 
needs of the few and, above all, the political elite.43  Unlike economic 
commerce, it is not so much based on reciprocity and competitive advan-
tage as on the fantastic consumption demands of a small ruling class, 
which cannot be satisfied within the boundaries of the community that 
they rule.  The commerce of luxury is entirely consistent with the spirit 
of the conquerors—and indeed of despotism—as Montesquieu shows in 
his discussion of Portugal and China.44 The commerce of luxury that is 
based on conquest and empire is exploitative; it is not economically ra-
tional in the sense of being conducive to the general economic welfare 
either in the conquering or the conquered state. Montesquieu uses the 
example of the colonial commerce of Spain: 
It is a bad kind of wealth . . . which does not depend on the industry of 
the nation, the number of inhabitants, nor the cultivation of the earth. 
The king of Spain, who receives great sums from his customs house in 
Cadiz, is in this respect but a very rich individual in a very poor state. 
Everything passes directly from the foreigners to himself without his 
subjects having any part; this commerce is independent of the good or 
bad fortune of his kingdom.45 
Montesquieu explains the difference between the commerce of luxury 
and economic commerce in the following way: 
Commerce is related to the constitution. In an autocracy, it is usually 
based on luxury, and whatever it may do to serve real needs, its princi-
pal object is to procure for the nation engaged in it everything that can 
serve the vanity, whims and fantasies of the ruler. In a mixed regime, it 
is more often based on economy. Merchants, who keep an eye on all 
the nations of the earth, bring to one what they take from another.46 
Economic commerce is, in its origin, the commerce of the impover-
ished, the powerless, and the oppressed. People who either lack a fertile 
territory or have been deprived of their territory (Montesquieu mentions 
Jews and other displaced peoples) manage through work to create some-
thing of value to others, which can then be traded to meet the basic needs 
                                                                                                             
 43. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 3, bk. XX, ch. 4. 
 44. Id. bk. VII, ch. 6 (discussion of China); id. bk. XX, ch. 20 (discussion of Portu-
gal). 
 45. Id. bk. XXI, ch. 22. 
 46. Id. bk. XX, ch. 4. 
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of self-preservation.47  Whereas the logic of the commerce of luxury is 
taking something of value from others in order not to have to make it 
oneself, economic commerce is based on helping oneself through indus-
try that gives something of value to others. Montesquieu says of Mar-
seille: 
The barrenness of the terrain led its citizens to economic commerce. 
They had no choice but to be hardworking, to provide what nature had 
denied; they had to be just in order to live among barbarian nations that 
were the key to their prosperity, and to be moderate so that their gov-
ernment was always calm. . . . One has seen everywhere that violence 
and conflict give birth to economic commerce, when human beings are 
constrained to be refugees, in marshes, on islands, in the far reaches of 
the ocean, and even its limits.48 
Economic commerce is natural in the sense that it is based on actual 
needs that human beings have as human beings, or closely rooted in 
those needs (contributing to self-preservation, basic comfort and secu-
rity). The commerce of luxury, by contrast, reflects the capacity of cer-
tain human beings to acquire material needs that are detached from na-
ture, based on fantasies and prejudices. 
This allows us to understand better Montesquieu’s remark that “[t]he 
natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace.”49 This remark applies to 
economic commerce: the reciprocity of natural human needs is served 
through peaceful mutual dependency. In this kind of commerce the buy-
ing and the selling nation both receive something of which they are natu-
rally needful. But commerce driven by luxury seeks to take what will 
serve its fantastical needs from wherever that thing can be found, regard-
less of reciprocity. Where necessary, such taking may well be by force—
hence, conquest and exploitation. 
As well, the commerce of luxury has quite different internal effects 
than economic commerce. As Montesquieu suggests, the commerce of 
luxury may leave the general population of a state worse off; if the com-
merce of luxury is not based on exploitation of other peoples through 
conquest and colonialism, it may well be based on exploitation of one’s 
own people. Montesquieu gives the example of Poland: 
A few lords possess entire provinces; they press the workers so they 
can have a greater quantity of wheat that they can send abroad and ob-
tain the things that their luxury demands. If Poland had no trade with 
any nation, these peoples would be happier. The powerful, who would 
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having nothing but their wheat, would give it to the peasants in order to 
live; too large domains being in their charge, they would share them 
with their peasants; everyone would find leather and wool in their 
flocks, there would no longer be an immense cost in the making of 
clothing; the powerful, who always love luxury, and who could not find 
it other than in their own country, would encourage the poor to work.50 
It is the harshness of political rule and the lack of familiarity with the 
“commodities of life”—and not climate or culture—that, for Montes-
quieu, best explains poverty in the South: 
There are two types of poor peoples: those that the harshness of the 
government has rendered such; and these are incapable of hardly any 
virtue, because their poverty is part of their servitude; the others are 
only poor for having disdained, or not having known the commodities 
of life; and these can do great things, for their poverty is part of their 
liberty.51 
Poverty should not be associated with laziness or indolence as a hard-
wired cultural characteristic. Under exploitative political rule, people are 
poor and idle not because such necessities as they require are available 
without toil, but because their labor benefits not themselves but the luxu-
rious tastes of their masters. In a “free” subsistence society, people are 
poor and appear idle, not knowing or caring much about the “commodi-
ties of life”; they focus their energies elsewhere. 
Montesquieu’s distinction between the commerce of luxury and eco-
nomic commerce plays a major role in his analysis of the political moral-
ity of commerce and its legal regulation.  In free societies, which are 
characterized by economic commerce rather than the commerce of lux-
ury, there is more, not less regulation of commerce than in societies 
characterized by political servitude. “Freedom of commerce is not a ca-
pacity given to merchants to do what they want; that would more likely 
be servitude. That which disadvantages the trader does not, for that, dis-
advantage trade.”52 Commerce can serve the interests of building na-
tional wealth and creating employment, but it may well not do so without 
government regulation. An example that Montesquieu gives is that Eng-
land prohibits the export of its wool.53 By such a prohibition, we can 
surmise, England assures itself of a trade in cloth and clothing made 
from English wool, which benefits the public interest more than a trade 
in wool itself, because in addition to those employed in the production of 
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wool, England now has many who are employed in the production of 
cloth and clothing for global markets. 
The commerce of luxury, as opposed to economic commerce, tends 
toward monopolies of trade in certain products or with certain countries.  
Montesquieu is very critical of these kinds of restrictions, as well as the 
granting of exclusive privileges to particular merchants or trading com-
panies on certain routes of commerce: “The true maxim is to not exclude 
any nation from one’s commerce without great reasons.”54 In fact, con-
testation of control or monopoly rights over commerce with a particular 
country or region turns commerce into a zero-sum game, leading to jeal-
ousy, concern with relative gains, and possible military conflict.55 The 
attempt of Spain and Portugal to stabilize this competition by dividing 
the world into two commercial empires failed: “[T]he other nations of 
Europe did not leave them in peace to enjoy their division: the Dutch 
chased the Portuguese out of almost all of East Asia and various nations 
made settlements in the Americas.”56 Montesquieu describes a world 
where economic commerce is always susceptible to being frustrated both 
by the ambition of political elites to co-opt it for their own needs—to 
make it or remake it into the commerce of luxury57—and by the suscep-
tibility of governments to give traders special privileges and monopolies 
that limit the ability of commerce to spread wealth and employment 
widely, both within states and globally. 
IV. WAR, CONQUEST AND ECONOMIC COMMERCE 
Although war and conquest often result in the disruption of economic 
commerce58 and the expansion of luxury commerce through colonialism, 
according to Montesquieu, war has also contributed positively to the de-
velopment of economic commerce. First of all, as we have already dis-
cussed, war has resulted in peoples being displaced and put in a situation 
of necessity that spurred their commercial spirit. Secondly, as Montes-
quieu emphasizes in his discussion of Alexander the Great—a central 
figure in both the chapters of the Spirit of the Laws on war and conquest, 
and those on commerce—conquest can lead to the discovery of routes of 
navigation that open up new possibilities for economic commerce.59  
Conquest can increase the knowledge of the world that is essential to 
economic commerce, but often inhibited by religion and prejudice. And, 
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finally, as Montesquieu had indicated in his discussion of Alexander the 
Great in the chapters of the Spirit of the Laws on war and conquest, con-
quest can lead to intermixing of peoples and customs and the actual re-
moval of prejudices that limit or inhibit communication between peoples, 
including commerce. 
The fact that war and conquest have actually spurred, or contributed to 
the development of, economic commerce—even if they have also de-
stroyed it in certain places and for certain periods of time—does not 
really provide much support for the hope Montesquieu appears to hold 
out, that commerce will lead to a stable peace. The pacific aims and 
manners of people who engage in commerce may have the effect of mak-
ing states dominated by such people less bellicose, but if other states re-
gard commerce as a means of taking wealth to satisfy the needs of their 
political and social elites, or as a zero-sum game for the world’s re-
sources, why should economic commerce with its pacific aims and man-
ners triumph? As Pierre Manent suggests, “After all, the benefits of com-
merce exemplified by [commercial peoples] only have a place in the 
interstices of general violence sustained by traditional war-like politics, 
politics as usual, and appear then to depend for their very existence on 
this violence.”60 
To appreciate Montesquieu’s answer to this objection, one should be-
gin with his observation that trading peoples have responded to violence 
by ingeniously protecting themselves against rapacious and bellicose 
powers. Montesquieu’s example is that of “letters of exchange,” whose 
invention Montesquieu attributes to the Jews.61 Through the storing of 
wealth in intangible form, commerce “can elude violence.”62 The ability 
of any individual state to suppress this transnational activity becomes 
limited, and thus “[w]e have begun to cure ourselves of Machiavellian-
ism, and we continue to cure ourselves day by day.”63 Absolute sover-
eignty shows itself as a myth, and the attempt by the sovereign to use 
instruments of coercion to control that which exceeds the limits of his 
territory shows itself as mere imprudence. Moreover, whereas in the past 
commerce may have been dependent on the bellicose state and its con-
quests to chart previously unknown territory and open up routes of trade 
and navigation, the means of doing so are now in the hands of the traders 
themselves, thanks to the compass: “Today one discovers lands by sea 
voyages; in early times, one discovered seas by the conquest of lands.”64 
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But “letters of exchange” surely depend upon trust, probity and per-
haps legality (at least a lex mercatoria) for their effectiveness. They sug-
gest the possibility of a legal order beyond a state or closed political 
community, just as Alexander the Great’s model of “empire,” mixing 
different peoples and their customs, suggests the possibility of a social 
order beyond the state or closed political community. 
By making sovereignty less effective, Montesquieu appears to suggest, 
a transnational commercial order will also make it less attractive, at least 
in the long run.  And, just as the sovereign has been rendered less capa-
ble of depriving the transnational commercial class of its property and 
profits, the sovereign cannot easily destroy their knowledge of different 
lands and their customs. Knowledge of this kind allows a certain libera-
tion from national or religious prejudice (which ultimately occurs, ac-
cording to Montesquieu, due to ignorance of ourselves, i.e., our common 
humanity, and can only be cured by knowing others). Commerce de-
pends on knowing and trusting the other. The grounds for keeping peo-
ples apart become questionable if such trust is possible. The practice of 
commerce through trust and reciprocity implies a common language of 
human needs and, minimally at least, of cooperation to meet those needs. 
This is a different beginning point for understanding the problem of 
social coordination than that adopted by the older political philosophers, 
who sought to establish the legitimate or the best political order, or 
closed political community. It is a beginning point closer to Montes-
quieu’s own in the Spirit of the Laws, which is a state of nature where 
human beings are essentially oriented toward the satisfaction of basic 
needs and where their sense of timidity or vulnerability precludes them 
from imagining the idea of dominating others, even in order to satisfy 
those basic needs.  In the state of nature, vulnerability has the conse-
quence of keeping human beings apart, not just of keeping them from 
fighting. It thus precludes the arts of peace as well as of war. Commerce 
represents the idea of human society based not upon rule or domination 
but mutual neediness.  Any closed society (chaque societe particuliere) 
has the effect of making human beings forget their timidity or vulnerabil-
ity, giving them the feeling of “force”65; they thus become war-like to-
wards other closed societies and try to dominate one another on the in-
side. Commerce, by contrast (that is to say, commerce that is not itself 
the product of the ambition and avarice of closed societies and their lead-
ers), means the dependency on others for meeting one’s natural human 
needs—the needs based in comfortable and secure self-preservation—or, 
in short, the ground of social interaction. It does not lead to a sense that 
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one has the power to take from the other what one wants, but rather that 
one must win it freely. This is illustrated by Montesquieu in identifying 
the commercial spirit with the spirit of peoples who have not had a terri-
torial state, or whose territorial state has been taken away from them.66 
These peoples have been cured of—or are free of—the illusion of 
“force” that comes from being in a closed, “sovereign” political commu-
nity on a defined territory. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Commerce does not guarantee or secure peace in a world of sovereign 
states; rather, commerce represents for Montesquieu an alternative to a 
world of sovereign states, of closed political communities—a model of 
peaceful social cooperation that requires laws and conventions, certainly, 
but of a transnational, transpolitical kind.  We now understand the mean-
ing of Montesquieu’s notion that the model for law is not nomos (the 
custom or way of a particular society or community) but something more 
universal, a concept of order or structure that is prior to and more funda-
mental than nomos.67 However, while implicit in the idea of law, the 
transnational, transpolitical order must be built out of the diverse nomoi 
of existing political communities. Commerce, by illustrating how state-
less merchants have maintained an order among themselves to sustain 
exchange across the most diverse societies, helps point the way. 
The first stage is indicated by the idea of a republican federation sug-
gested in Book IX of the Spirit of the Laws.  Montesquieu’s deepest prac-
tical intent is the federalization of closed political societies through legal 
integration, with the laws chosen being those most favorable to freedom; 
this is what informs his obsessive concern about the differences of posi-
tive laws and the sources of those differences. Perhaps we should not 
project onto his sober spirit the actual project of world government or a 
universal liberal society.  But, without some such conception, his conten-
tions about the relationship of commerce, war and peace collapse into a 
set of contradictions, paradoxes and tautologies.         
 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. bk. XX, ch. 5. 
 67. Id. bk. I, ch. 1. 
